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CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
2002:
AN OVERVIEW
Patrick J. Monahan*
Nadine Blum**
These two volumes (volumes 20 and 21) of the Supreme Court Law Review,
which consist of the papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 6th
Annual Constitutional Cases Conference held on April 4, 2003, examine the
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the
calendar year 2002.1 The Court handed down a total of 88 decisions in 2002, 2
23 (or 26 per cent) of which were constitutional cases. 3 The vast majority of the
constitutional cases in 2002 were Charter cases (19/23 cases) with only four
federalism cases, one of which (Kitkatla) raised significant Aboriginal issues.
It continues to be extremely difficult to get a case before the Supreme Court of
Canada. There were just 13 appeals as of right in 2002, the lowest number in the
past decade. In terms of applications for leave to appeal, this past year the Court
granted leave in just 10 per cent of applications submitted to the Court, as
compared with 12 per cent of applications that were successful in 2001 and 13
* Professor of Law and Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School.
** Osgoode Hall Law School, Class 2005.
1
A case is considered to be a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada,” as defined in s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Supreme Court of Canada, Statistics 1992 to 2002: Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition,
available at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca> [hereinafter “Statistics”].
3
The 23 constitutional decisions in calendar year 2002 were as follows: Ahani v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 2 [hereinafter “Ahani”]; Babcock v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2002 SCC 57 [hereinafter “Babcock”]; Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),
2002 SCC 84 [hereinafter “Gosselin”]; Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business,
Tourism and Culture) 2002 SCC 31 [hereinafter “Kitkatla”]; Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, 2002
SCC 65 [hereinafter “Krieger”]; Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White,
Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada (Attorney General).; R. v. Fink, 2002 SCC 61 [hereinafter
“Lavallee”]; Lavoie v. Canada, 2002 SCC 23 [hereinafter “Lavoie”]; Mackin v. New Brunswick
(Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13 [hereinafter “Mackin”]; Moreau-Bérubé
v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11 [hereinafter “Moreau-Bérubé”]; Nova Scotia
(Attorney General) v. Walsh, 2002 SCC 83 [hereinafter “Walsh”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v.
Laroche, 2002 SCC 72 [hereinafter “Laroche”]; R. v. Fliss, 2002 SCC 16 [hereinafter “Fliss”]; R. v.
Guignard, 2002 SCC 14 [hereinafter “Guignard”]; R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64 [hereinafter “Hall”]; R. v.
Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73 [hereinafter “Jarvis”]; R. v. Law, 2002 SCC 10 [hereinafter “Law”]; R. v. Ling,
2002 SCC 74 [hereinafter “Ling”]; R. v. Noël, 2002 SCC 67 [hereinafter “Noël”]; Ruby v. Canada
(Solicitor General), 2002 SCC 75 [hereinafter “Ruby”]; R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada
Beverages (West) Ltd., 2002 SCC 8 [hereinafter “Pepsi”]; Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),
2002 SCC 68 [hereinafter “Sauvé”]; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2002 SCC 1 [hereinafter “Suresh”]; Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 17 [hereinafter
“Ward”].
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per cent in 2000. This decrease in successful leave applications is even more
significant when one considers that there were about 25 per cent fewer
applications for leave filed in 2002 (the first time in the past three years when
leave applications declined.)4
Another trend that has emerged in recent years, and which continued in 2002,
is a reduction in the number of appeals heard by the Court. While the Court
released 88 judgments in 2002, it heard just 72 appeals in 51 sitting days. Last
year the Court also took an average of seven months from the date of hearing to
the date of judgment in cases where judgment is reserved, which is a very slight
increase from 2001. This suggests a desire on the part of the Court to take
sufficient time for reflection and discussion amongst the members of Court on the
important appeals that are heard.
While it is always difficult to offer generalizations about the wide variety of
constitutional decisions handed down in a given year, a number of significant
themes did emerge from the Court’s constitutional docket in 2002. First, the
Court was extremely receptive to Charter claims in 2002. Over 60 per cent of the
Charter claims adjudicated by the Court were successful last year, which is the
highest success rate for Charter claimants since 1985. Second, there were
unusually sharp divisions amongst members of the Court in Charter cases last
year, with at least one member of the Court dissenting in close to 50 per cent of
the Court’s Charter decisions. This is a departure from the experience in 2001,
when the Court was unanimous in about three-quarters of its constitutional
decisions. Third, the Court’s approach to federalism and Aboriginal cases in 2002
differed markedly from that in Charter cases. In the four federalism and
Aboriginal cases handed down in 2002 the Court upheld all of the various
statutory provisions that were being challenged, and in each instance the Court
was unanimous.
One innovation in our analysis this year is an attempt to identify those
decisions which will have the greatest impact on the future development of
Charter jurisprudence. We polled the 43 members of the Osgoode Hall Law
School’s Constitutional Advisory Board, made up of leading academics,
practitioners and government lawyers from across the country, for their view as to
the most significant constitutional decisions of the year. The results, set out in
Table 1 below, indicate a fairly broad consensus that the Gosselin case was the
most significant constitutional decision of 2002. In Gosselin the Court upheld
Quebec regulations which had provided lower benefit levels for younger
claimants under Quebec’s welfare scheme in the 1980s. As is discussed below,
what makes Gosselin such a significant case is precisely the fact that the claim in
the case failed. The issue raised was whether governments are under a

4
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constitutional obligation to provide a minimum level of social benefits to
individuals in Canadian society. Had the result gone the other way, and the Court
found that governments were under such a positive constitutional obligation, it
could potentially have led to a very dramatic increase in the judicial scrutiny
applied to social welfare and benefit programs. In effect, the result in Gosselin
suggests that the Court remains cautious about extending its reach into this area,
preferring to leave fairly wide scope for the exercise of discretion by legislatures
and governments in their decisions about the design and funding of such
programs.

TABLE 1
Most Significant Constitutional Cases of 2002
(As selected by Osgoode Hall Law School’s
Constitutional Advisory Board)
Rank

Case

1
2
3
4
5

Gosselin
Sauvé
Suresh
Jarvis
Walsh
Lavallee

Total Votes
17
9
7
6
4
4

The other Charter case from 2002 that was regarded as particularly
significant by the Constitutional Advisory Board was Sauvé. Here the Court, by
a narrow 5-4 margin, struck down a provision in the Canada Elections Act
which denied the right to vote to prisoners who are sentenced to terms of two
years or more in a correctional institution. Sauvé is significant not only because
it involved the invalidation of an important provision in federal law, but also
because that provision had been enacted in response to an earlier Court ruling
which had invalidated a broader ban on prisoners’ voting rights. Thus Sauvé
provided an opportunity to observe the Court’s attitude towards so-called
“reply” legislation and the extent to which courts and legislatures can be said to
be engaged in a Charter “dialogue.” While the Court generally has embraced
the “dialogue” metaphor (and all members of the Court in Sauvé refer
approvingly to it), the deep divisions in Sauvé indicate that there is no
consensus on the practical implications of this approach to Charter adjudication
when it comes to deciding actual cases.

6
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I. CHARTER CASES
The Court was more receptive to Charter claims in 2002 than in any year
since 1985. Charter claims succeeded in 12 of the 19 cases handed down in
2002, a success rate of 63 per cent, which far exceeds the average success rate
over the past decade of about 35 per cent (See Table 2 below). 5

TABLE 2
Success Rate of Charter Claimants
Supreme Court of Canada 1991-2002
Year

Charter Challenges

Claimant Succeeds

Success Rate

1991

35

15

43%

1992

38

12

32%

1993

42

9

21%

Year

Charter Challenges

Claimant Succeeds

Success Rate

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

26
33
35
20
21
14
11
16
19

11
8
8
10
8
5
3
7
12

42%
24%
23%
50%
38%
36%
27%
44%
63%

TOTAL

310

108

35%

Six of the successful Charter claims in 2002 involved the invalidation of
federal or provincial legislation. Four of the statutes were federal (in Sauvé,
Lavallee, Hall and Ruby) while two were provincial (in Mackin and Guignard).
Five successful Charter cases involved challenges to government action (Jarvis,

5

A Charter claim is treated as being successful when the claimant receives some form of relief under s. 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, or where a statute or other
legal rule is declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
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Ling, Law, Suresh, and Noël) while the final successful Charter claim involved
a challenge to a common law rule (Pepsi).
1. Challenges to Legislation
(a) The “Dialogue” Between Courts and Legislatures
The fact that there is an ongoing internal debate amongst members of the
Court regarding the appropriate level of deference to be afforded to Parliament
was highlighted in the Sauvé decision. In this case, a 5-4 majority rejected
Parliament’s “reply” legislation that denied the right to vote in federal elections
to every person incarcerated in a correctional facility for two or more years.
The original legislation, struck down in a 1993 Court decision, had imposed a
broader restriction on prisoners’ voting rights, denying the right to vote to all
those incarcerated.
The impugned provision, section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act, was
challenged on the basis of the right to vote contained in section 3 of the
Charter. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing on behalf of a majority consisting of
Arbour, Binnie, Iacobucci, and LeBel JJ., refused to adopt a deferential
approach in response to Charter “dialogue” and held that the right to vote is a
fundamental value of Canadian democracy that cannot be compromised absent
a reasonably convincing rationale. The Chief Justice rejected the argument that
the Court should defer to Parliament since the impugned provision had been
enacted in response to an earlier decision of the Court:
[T]he fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed judicial rejection
of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean that the Court should defer
to Parliament as part of a “dialogue”. Parliament must ensure that whatever law it
6
passes, at whatever stage of the process, conforms to the Constitution.

However, as Richard Haigh points out in his commentary on this case, the
majority decision in Sauvé leaves unanswered the question whether any
restriction on prisoners’ voting rights will be able to meet the section 1
justification threshold. In Haigh’s words, “If dialogue is to mean anything, the
Court should, to the extent possible, expressly indicate whether Parliament is
able to restrict prisoners’ voting rights or not.” 7 He also expresses concern that
“The lack of direction will almost certainly lead to another round of litigation if
the federal government tries to tamper with prisoner voting rights again.” 8 On
6

Supra, note 2, at para. 17.
Haigh, “Between Here and There is Better Than Anything Over There: The Morass of
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)” article included in this volume.
8
Id., at 353.
7

8
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the other hand, as of August 2003, no such reply legislation has been
introduced, which may suggest that the government is prepared to accept the
outcome produced by this second round of litigation on prisoners’ voting rights.
David Brown argues in his commentary on Sauvé that the Court has
entrenched a less-deferential approach to section 1 when it comes to the issue
of voting rights and thus may have, in effect, elevated the section 3 right to vote
to a status above other Charter rights such as section 15(1) or section 7. Brown
claims that the majority decision is difficult to reconcile with the oft-repeated
view that there is no “hierarchy of rights” under the Charter. In Brown’s view,
the majority in Sauvé seems to suggest that greater scrutiny will be applied to
government attempts to justify restrictions on section 3 rights, as compared
with rights protected by other Charter provisions. 9 At the same time, it should
be recalled that the Court has on numerous occasions applied what appear to be
somewhat differing levels of scrutiny to impugned legislation under section 1.10
Indeed, the 1998 judgment of Bastarache J. in Thomson Newspapers attempts
to rationalize these differing results and to argue that they reflect a broader set
of factors and considerations that are regarded as relevant to the section 1
analysis.11
The majority judgment of McLachlin C.J. in Sauvé stands in stark contrast to
that of the minority, written by Gonthier J. and concurred in by Bastarache,
L’Heureux-Dubé, and Major JJ. Justice Gonthier argues that the “dialogue
model” necessitates a more deferential approach to Parliament in light of
competing values and sociopolitical considerations with which government
must contend. Justice Gonthier argues that the governing values are to be
determined through a “dialogue” between government and the courts in which
Parliament has the last word:
In my view, especially in the context of the case at bar, the heart of the dialogue
metaphor is that neither the courts nor Parliament hold a monopoly on the
determination of values. Importantly, the dialogue metaphor does not signal a
lowering of the section 1 justification standard. It simply suggests that when, after a
full and rigorous section 1 analysis, Parliament has satisfied the court that it has
established a reasonable limit to a right that is demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society, the dialogue ends; the court lets Parliament have the last word
and does not substitute Parliament’s reasonable choices with its own.12

9
Brown, “Sauvé and Prisoners’ Voting Rights: The Death of the Good Citizen?” article included in this volume.
10
See the discussion of these varying results and approaches to s. 1 in Monahan, Constitutional Law (2nd ed., 2002), at 414-22.
11
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877.
12
Sauvé, supra, note 3, at para. 104.
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Justice Gonthier argues that permitting the exercise of the franchise by
offenders incarcerated for serious offences undermines the rule of law and civic
responsibility, since these offenders have “attacked the stability and order
within our community.”13 Therefore, the minority holds that temporary
disenfranchisement of criminals may serve a valid educative purpose in “civic
responsibility and respect for the rule of law.” 14 Given that Parliament has made
a reasonable choice, Gonthier J. would hold that the Court ought to defer to that
decision.
The so-called “dialogue” model, originally proposed by Dean Hogg and
Alison Bushell in a path-breaking 1997 article in the Osgoode Hall Law
Journal15 and subsequently embraced by the Supreme Court in its 1998
decision in Vriend,16 has now been widely accepted as a useful basis for
understanding the Court’s Charter jurisprudence. According to this theory, the
Court is engaged in a “dialogue” with legislatures and governments in
developing the meaning of the Charter, and the enactment of “reply” legislation
following an adverse court ruling is cited by Hogg and Bushell as evidence of
the existence of this dialogue. Both the majority and the minority in Sauvé refer
approvingly to the “dialogue” theory. This suggests that, while the Court may
well have embraced the dialogue metaphor in principle, significant divisions
remain as to how it is to be applied and its implications in concrete cases that
come before the Court.
The issue of the constitutionality of “reply” legislation was also examined in
R. v. Hall, and here the majority of the Court was ultimately more deferential in
its approach. The provision at issue was section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal
Code,17 which permitted the denial of bail for the purpose of maintaining
“public confidence in the administration of justice” as well as for “any other
just cause being shown”. This provision had been enacted by Parliament
following R. v. Morales,18 in which an earlier provision (which had permitted
the denial of bail “in the public interest”) had been struck down by the Court on
grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague.
In Hall the Court unanimously found the opening phrase of the “reply”
legislation, which allowed the withholding of bail “on any other just cause
being shown,” to be invalid on the basis that it conferred an open-ended judicial
discretion to deny bail. This was inconsistent with the Charter section 11
13

Id., at para. 114.
Id., at para. 116.
15
Hogg and Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 97.
16
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
17
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
18
[1992] 3 S.C.R. 711.
14
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guarantee that an individual will not be denied bail except on the basis of “just
cause,” since it is a fundamental principle of justice that an individual cannot be
denied bail on the basis of a vague legal provision.19 However, the Court split
5-4 on the constitutionality of the remainder of the provision, allowing the
denial of bail “where the detention is necessary in order to maintain confidence
in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances,
including the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, the gravity of the
nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission and the
potential for a lengthy term of imprisonment.” The majority judgment, written
by McLachlin C.J., and concurred in by L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Bastarache
and Binnie JJ., upheld the remainder of the provision on grounds that the denial
of bail for the purposes of maintaining public confidence is a valid objective.
Moreover, the majority found that the provision was not unconstitutionally
vague since it specifically identified four factors to be taken into account by a
judge in exercising this discretion.
The dissent, written by Iacobucci J. for Major, Arbour, and LeBel JJ., would
have struck down the entire subsection. In Iacobucci J.’s view, the two other
grounds for denying bail included in the Criminal Code (namely, public safety
and for ensuring attendance in court) were sufficient, making this additional
ground unnecessary for the proper functioning of the bail system, as per the test
enunciated in Morales.
The overall result in Hall is consistent with the “vagueness” decisions that
have followed Morales, in which the Court has demonstrated a reluctance to
strike down provisions on grounds that they were unconstitutionally vague.
This is particularly so when statutes contemplate the exercise of discretion by
the courts. Even in cases where statutes utilize broad and open-ended language,
the Court has indicated a willingness to uphold such legislation, provided it sets
out some sort of framework for the orderly exercise of judicial discretion. 20
(b) The Balance Between Security and Liberty Post 9/11
Another important theme in the 2002 year was the appropriate balance
between the need to maintain collective security in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, and the potential threat posed by such law
enforcement measures to civil liberties. In January 2002, in the companion
cases of Suresh and Ahani,21 the Court surprised some commentators by
upholding provisions in the Immigration Act which permitted the Minister to
order the deportation of persons who posed a “danger to the security of Canada”
19
20
21

Hall, supra, note 3, at para. 12.
See R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606.
Supra, note 3.
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even where those persons faced the risk to torture following their deportation. 22
The Court also found that the term “terrorism,” which was used but not defined
in the Act, had a sufficiently settled meaning as to permit legal adjudication. At
the same time, the Court upheld the statutory provision only on the basis that
cases in which deportation to face torture would be justified would be
“exceptional.”23 As such, the Court indicated a willingness to subject legislation
impinging on civil liberties in the name of national security to a narrow
interpretation, even in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11.
In Lavallee, released in September 2002, the Court confirmed it willingness
to subject law enforcement procedures to significant scrutiny, even at the risk
of potentially limited government’s ability to detect and prosecute serious
criminal activity. The case arose when law firms had made claims of solicitorclient privilege after materials had been seized from lawyers’ offices pursuant
to section 488.1 of the Criminal Code. The reasoning in the case is significant
since section 488.1, which set out the procedure for determining a claim of
solicitor-client privilege in relation to documents seized from a law office under
a warrant, parallels similar provisions found in the Income Tax Act as well as in
the more recently enacted Money Laundering legislation. Section 488.1
required that where an officer examined, copied, or seized any document from
a lawyer’s office for which the lawyer had claimed solicitor-client privilege, the
officer would seal the documents and place them in custody with local
authorities. Within strict time periods, the solicitor, client, or Attorney General
could apply to the court for a determination of whether the material was in fact
privileged.
Justice Arbour, for the majority (McLachlin C.J., Iacobucci, Major,
Bastarache and Binnie JJ. concurring), held that solicitor-client privilege is
protected under section 8 of the Charter as part of a client’s fundamental right
to privacy. Section 488.1 could not be upheld as it more than minimally
impaired solicitor-client privilege. Due to the strict time lines to apply for a
determination that the material was privileged, it was possible that documents
which would otherwise rightly be deemed as privileged would be disclosed to
the state should the client’s lawyer fail to meet the deadline. The provision
violated section 8, could not be upheld under section 1, and was invalid.
Another flaw in the legislation was the possibility, as per section 488.1(4)(b),
that a judge could allow the Attorney General to examine the documents to
assist him or her in deciding whether or not the documents were privileged.
These flaws in the legislation, along with others, led the majority to conclude

22

Although on the facts in Suresh the Court overturned the Minister’s deportation order, in
both Suresh and Ahani the constitutional validity of the underlying statutory provisions was upheld.
23
Suresh, supra, note 3, at para. 78.
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that the client’s section 8 rights were not adequately protected by section 488.1
and thus the legislation was unreasonable. As commentators Mahmud Jamal
and Brian Morgan note, this case is significant because it is the first time
solicitor-client privilege has been used to strike down legislation. Further,
solicitor-client privilege is now protected under both sections 7 and 8 of the
Charter, though Arbour J. relied solely on section 8 to strike down the
provision.24
The Court’s ringing endorsement of solicitor-client privilege in Lavallee
may have contributed to the federal government’s subsequent announcement on
March 20, 2003, to withdraw money-laundering regulations under the Proceeds
of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act25 which would have
required lawyers to report any large cash transactions, terrorist property and
suspicious transactions by their clients to a new federal agency. 26 The Canadian
Federation of Law Societies had launched a constitutional challenge to the
regulations. Despite this reversal, the government has stated that it still intends
to bring lawyers into the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist regulatory
scheme. However, as of August 2003, the necessary regulations had not been
announced.27
(c) Gosselin and Positive Rights Under the Charter
In 2002, the case with the most significance for the development of Charter
jurisprudence was Gosselin, in which the Court upheld an age-based distinction
in Quebec’s provincial welfare regulations by a narrow 5-4 margin. The
Charter issue arose when Louise Gosselin challenged section 29(a) of Quebec’s
Regulation Respecting Social Aid [Regulation] made under the 1984 Social Aid
Act, which provided for a two-tiered system of welfare benefits: persons under
age 30 were entitled to approximately one third of the benefits provided to
those over 30. The Regulation also provided that persons under 30 could make
up the two-thirds reduction through participation in education and workexperience programs. In 1989, this scheme had been repealed and replaced by
regulations not based on age. Louise Gosselin brought a claim on behalf of
24

Jamal and Morgan, “The Constitutionalization of Solicitor-Client Privilege” article included in this volume.
25
S.C. 2001, c. 17.
26
The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17
— published in Part I of the Canada Gazette on June 22, 2002.
27
“Lawyers Removed From Proceeds of Crime Reporting Requirements” (25 March 2003)
online:
Continuing
Legal
Education
Society
of
British
Columbia
<http://www.cle.bc.ca/CLE/Stay+Current/Collection/2003/3/03-fedleg-pcmltfarepeal.htm > (date
accessed: 14 August 2003).
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some 75,000 welfare claimants under age 30 who had received reduced welfare
benefits during the 1987 to 1989 period, seeking a declaration that the age
distinction in the Regulation was invalid and that, therefore, the members of the
class should be reimbursed for the benefit reduction arising from the fact that
they were at that time under age 30.
Ms. Gosselin’s Charter claim was based both on section 15 (on the theory
that the distinction between those over 30 versus those under 30 was
inconsistent with section 15’s guarantee against age discrimination) as well as
on the basis of section 7 (on the theory that the guarantee of life, liberty and
security of the person provides a positive obligation on the state to provide a
minimum level of social benefits to needy individuals.) Both claims were
rejected, the section 7 claim by a substantial 7-2 margin and the section 15
claim by a narrow 5-4 margin.
The Gosselin case is mainly significant for the Court’s analysis of the claim
that section 7 of the Charter places positive obligations on the state to protect
life, liberty and security of the person. Writing for the majority, McLachlin C.J.
(for Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie and LeBel JJ.), held that
section 29(a) of the Regulation did not infringe section 7 of the Charter. The
claim that the appellant’s section 7 Charter rights were infringed was based on
three claims: first, that economic rights are protected by the right to life, liberty
and security of the person; second, that a failure to provide adequate benefits
constitutes a “deprivation” by the state; and third, that the “deprivation” at issue
was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Chief Justice
McLachlin reviewed the jurisprudence on section 7 and found that the purpose
of section 7 is to protect life, liberty, and security of the person from
deprivations that occur as a result of an individual’s interaction with the
administration of justice. In this case, the administration of justice was not
plainly implicated. While not ruling out the possibility that the interpretation of
section 7 could evolve incrementally to encompass deprivations occurring
outside of the context of the administration of justice, McLachlin C.J. found
that a larger hurdle to the section 7 argument was the fact that jurisprudence
does not suggest that section 7 places positive obligations on the state. Rather,
section 7 has been interpreted as restricting the state’s ability to deprive people
of life, liberty and security of the person. Such a deprivation, she found, did not
exist in the case at bar. Again, while refusing to rule out the possibility that
positive obligations on the state to sustain life, liberty or security of the person
could potentially be made out in special circumstances in a future case,
McLachlin C.J. held that this novel argument could not be accepted on the facts
before the Court.
The contrary argument — that there is a substantive and affirmative right to
the provision of economic support by government — was set forth in Arbour
J.’s dissent (joined by L’Heureux-Dubé J.) which concluded “that the section 7

14
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rights to ‘life, liberty and security of the person’ include a positive
dimension.”28 Justice Arbour’s dissent argues for a broad interpretation of
section 7:
Whereas the course of section 7 jurisprudence may have once supported a legalistic
reliance on the subheading “Legal Rights” as a way of delimiting the scope of
section 7 protection, the more recent turn in section 7 jurisprudence indicates that
this interpretive device has been supplanted by a purposive and contextual
approach to the recognition of constitutionally protected rights.29

Justice Arbour then sets forth a novel “two rights theory” of section 7. In so
doing, she rejects the “general impression” that the first clause in section 7, the
right to life, liberty and security of the person, is guaranteed, but only against
deprivations which violate principles of fundamental justice, as set out in the
second clause.30 Rather, Arbour J. argues, the fact that “the section’s first clause
affords some additional protection seems, as a purely textual matter, beyond
reasonable objection.”31 In her view, therefore, it should not be necessary to
demonstrate that there has been a positive “deprivation” by the state of a
protected interest (nor that such deprivation be contrary to the principles of
fundamental justice) in order to found a section 7 claim.
This interpretation of section 7 is a departure from the previously settled
interpretation of the provision which suggested that it conferred one right,
namely, the right not to be deprived of life, liberty or security of the person
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. This settled
approach to section 7 has been assumed by the Supreme Court in all cases
involving the provision over the past decade, since the Court has consistently
required not only that there be a deprivation of a protected section 7 right but
also that such deprivation be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice
before there can be a breach of section 7. 32 In Gosselin Arbour J. argued, in
contrast, that this established interpretation of section 7 as a one-right guarantee

28

Gosselin, supra, note 3, at para. 308.
Id., at para. 316.
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Id., at para. 340.
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For example, in Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519, the
majority of the Court found that the warrantless apprehension of a child deemed to be in need of
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had been developed based on an “impression” that this was the correct
interpretation. In her view, the Court had never explicitly ruled on the correct
approach to section 7.33 Further, Arbour J. cited a number of cases to support
her positive rights theory, including Dunmore,34 where the Court imposed a
positive obligation on the province of Ontario to guarantee the right of
association to agricultural workers.
As pointed out by Jamie Cameron elsewhere in this volume, 35 Arbour J.’s
analysis returned to the plain text of section 7 as a means of overcoming the
“doctrinal constraints” on section 7’s interpretation. Yet these doctrinal
constraints were themselves grounded in a deeper and important respect for the
institutional boundaries between courts and legislatures. If all that is necessary
to establish a breach of section 7 is a deprivation of “liberty” or “security of the
person,” the scope of the provision is exceptionally broad and would subject a
huge variety of government legislation and regulation to judicial scrutiny under
section 1. The established approach to section 7, one endorsed by the majority
in Gosselin, seeks to give a substantive interpretation to the provision while at
the same time respecting institutional boundaries by confining its content to the
administration of justice. In Professor Cameron’s view, one troubling aspect of
Arbour J.’s analysis is that she “disregards the question of boundaries on
review.” In fact, Cameron argues that throughout the entire Gosselin decision,
where issues of institutional competence should have been at the forefront, such
issues were largely ignored which, in her view, “can only place the legitimacy
of [judicial] review at risk.” 36
Although the section 7 claim in Gosselin failed by a substantial 7-2 margin,
6 of the 7 members of the majority refused to rule out the possibility that
section 7 could impose positive obligations on the state in a future case. This
leaves it open to litigants in future cases to advance similar positive rights
claims, which will inevitably work their way back up to the country’s highest
Court for consideration. It remains to be seen whether a future Court will, if at
all, deal with the important institutional considerations at stake in the
imposition of positive social benefit obligations on the state.

33
There is some support for this view in the judgment of Lamer J. (as he then was) in the
Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 500, where he had expressly left open
the issue of whether s. 7 consisted of one right or two. However his analysis of the “principles of
fundamental justice” in that case only has meaning if one assumes that it is necessary, in order to
make out a s. 7 claim, to find a breach of the principles of fundamental justice; as noted above,
subsequent cases has proceeded on this basis.
34
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 [hereinafter “Dunmore”].
35
Cameron, “Positive Obligations under Sections 15 and 7 of the Charter: A Comment on
Gosselin v. Québec” article included in this volume.
36
Id., at 65.
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With respect to section 15(1), the claim failed because, according to the
majority, there was no “discrimination,” which is a necessary element to a
section 15 claim. The section 15 debate between McLachlin C.J. and
Bastarache J. (who wrote the lead dissenting decision on this issue) revolved
around the question of whether the Regulation resulted in a violation of the
“human dignity” of welfare recipients under 30 years of age.
Chief Justice McLachlin’s analysis focused on the four contextual factors for
establishing discrimination and violation of human dignity that were originally
identified in the 1999 Law decision.37 The Chief Justice found that none of
these contextual factors led to the conclusion that the age distinction in the
Regulation violated the claimant’s human dignity.
First, McLachlin C.J. rejected the claim that members of the complainant
group suffered from pre-existing disadvantage, arguing that “[i]f anything,
people under 30 appear to be advantaged over older people in finding
employment.”38 Second, she held that the evidence indicated a correspondence
between the scheme and the actual circumstances of welfare recipients under 30
in cases where younger welfare recipients specifically lacked certain skills
required to get permanent jobs. In providing that younger recipients who
participated in education and skills program would receive increased benefits,
the government was implicitly recognizing the potential of youth by
encouraging them to participate in such programs. The third factor, regarding
the “ameliorative purpose,” was found to be neutral, since the scheme was not
designed to improve the conditions of another group. Finally, McLachlin C.J.
held that the findings of the trial judge and the evidence did not support the
view that the overall impact on the affected individuals undermined their
human dignity. In fact she concludes the opposite: “In my view, the interest
promoted by the differential treatment at issue in this case is intimately and
inextricably linked to the essential human dignity that animates the equality
guarantee set out at section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter.” 39
Justice Bastarache, in contrast, felt that age is an immutable personal
characteristic falling squarely within the section 15 principle that people should
not be penalized for something they cannot change. While McLachlin C.J.
rejected the claimant’s assertion that she should be compared to welfare
recipients over 30 (with the Chief Justice holding that the appropriate
comparators were people under age 30 versus those over 30), Bastarache J.
argued that contextual analysis required a consideration of the specific position

37
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [hereinafter “Law”].
38
Gosselin, supra, note 3, at para. 34.
39
Id., at para. 65.
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of young welfare recipients. He asks rhetorically, “If the vulnerability of the
appellant’s group as welfare recipients cannot be recognized at this stage, can
we really be said to be undertaking a contextual analysis?”40
The discussion of section 15(1) in Gosselin is just one more page in the
continuing saga of tortuous equality analysis at the Supreme Court. While all
members of the Court continue to embrace the framework for section 15 set
forth in Law, there are significant divisions as to how that analysis should be
applied in particular cases. Moreover, as various commentators have observed,
the contextual factors identified in Law are highly abstract and open-ended,
meaning that it is extremely difficult to predict how they will be applied in
future cases. Further, the line between section 15(1) and section 1 justification
analysis continues to become ever-more obscured, with many of the contextual
factors in Law seemingly identical to the kinds of considerations that would
normally be regarded as relevant under section 1. This tendency to incorporate
justification analysis into section 15(1) is worrying because it may make it
increasingly difficult as well as unpredictable for claimants to establish a prima
facie breach of their Charter equality rights.
This obstacle standing in the way of establishing even a prima facie breach
of section 15 is reflected in the fact that there was only one partially successful
section 15 claim at the Supreme Court in 2002: in Lavoie a hiring preference
for citizens in the federal public service was held to violate section 15 by seven
out of nine judges, but was upheld under section 1 by six of the nine. Contrast
this with the result in Walsh, where the Court found that the exclusion of
opposite-sex cohabiting couples from the Matrimonial Property Act41 was not
discrimination as it does not affect the dignity or deny access to benefits or
advantages available to married persons. What these cases indicate is that the
task of establishing a breach of section 15 continues to be a significant hurdle
for claimants to overcome, which seems a somewhat ironic legacy of the
Andrews case,42 the first section 15 case decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada and one which had called for a robust interpretation of section 15.
(d) Other Challenges to Legislation in 2002
Two challenges to provincial legislation were successful in 2002. In Mackin,
provincial legislation abolishing supernumerary judges was struck down on
grounds that it infringed guarantees of judicial independence; however the
claimants’ damages claim was dismissed. In Guignard, a municipal bylaw
40
41
42

Id., at para. 238.
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275, s. 2(g).
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
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prohibiting advertising signs was found to be unconstitutional as an unjustified
infringement of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, with
the declaration of invalidity suspended for six months.
Other challenges to legislation in 2002 included Moreau-Bérubé,43 Suresh
(which, as noted above, involved a challenge to legislation as well as to
government action), and Ruby. In Moreau-Bérubé the Court, led by Arbour J.,
unanimously rejected the Charter claim that the procedure for sanctioning the
misconduct of a provincial court judge, as provided for under the New
Brunswick Provincial Court Act, violated the principle of judicial
independence. The Court emphasized the fact that the alleged misconduct was
reviewed by a council composed primarily of judges, who would be sensitive to
the delicate balance between judicial independence and judicial integrity. In
Suresh, the Court unanimously rejected the claim that statutory provisions in
the Immigration Act allowing the deportation of a refugee facing risk of torture
were contrary to section 7 of the Charter. However, the Court also ruled that in
exercising the discretion conferred by section 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act,
the Minister must conform to the principles of fundamental justice under
section 7. The Minister’s decision to order the deportation of Suresh was held
to be inconsistent with section 7, on the basis that the Minister had failed to
adequately consider the risk of torture in making the deportation decision.
The claimant in Ruby, on the other hand, was successful in part in
challenging provisions of the Privacy Act on the basis of sections 7 and 2(b) of
the Charter. The provisions in question, section 52(2)(a) and (3), required in
camera hearings and ex parte representations when the government denied an
applicant’s request for access to personal information on the grounds of
national security or maintenance of foreign confidences. The claimant’s section
7 claim was unanimously rejected; Arbour J. ruled that ex parte submissions by
government were not contrary to section 7 as fairness is ensured through
procedural safeguards and rights of appeal. However, section 2(b) (freedom of
expression including the freedom to hear and read information relating to
government and the court system) was found to be violated by the mandatory in
camera hearings and this violation failed the proportionality test under section
1; the provision required the whole hearing (not just the parts of the evidence
covered by the exemptions) to be held in camera. The Court read down section
51(2)(a) to apply only to ex parte submissions mandated by section 51(3).

43

This case does not expressly address a constitutional provision, but considers whether the
statutory provisions are sufficient to protect judicial independence. Judicial independence is protected by s. 11(b) of the Charter and by the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867.
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2. Challenges to Government Action
A number of cases involving challenges to government action (as distinct
from challenges to legislation), and arising in the criminal context, brought to
light significant issues with respect to privacy, the right to protection from the
state from unreasonable search and seizure, and the manner in which personal
information is transmitted from one arm of government to another. In Ling and
Jarvis, heard concurrently by the Court, at issue was whether the use of
evidence obtained during an audit pursuant to sections 231.1(1) and 231.2(1) of
the Income Tax Act to further investigate offences under section 239(1)44
violates the taxpayer’s Charter rights. The Court, in a unanimous decision
written by Iacobucci and Major JJ., held that once the “predominant purpose”
of the investigation shifted from a routine audit to the determination of a
taxpayer’s penal liability under section 239, a warrant was required in order for
the search to be in compliance with Charter rights. This ruling resulted in the
exclusion of some evidence in Jarvis and the ordering of a new trial to
determine the admissibility of some evidence in Ling. Similarly in Law,
photocopied documents, obtained from a safe recovered by the police and
forwarded to tax authorities, were excluded as evidence. Justice Bastarache,
once again for a unanimous Court, held that the fact that the safe was stolen
property did not support the inference that the owner had relinquished his or her
section 8 expectation of privacy in such property; evidence obtained from the
recovered safe was thus excluded under section 24(2).
These decisions have been praised by some for the Court’s protection of an
accused’s right to privacy. One commentator said in response to the Jarvis
decision, “The Court has affirmed the robust constitutional protection of
privacy over information under section 8 of the Charter and imposed limits on
regulators in the context of investigating regulatory offences.” 45 However,
Robert Frater of the Department of Justice Canada has expressed concern that
the requirement that auditors obtain a warrant once the “predominant purpose”
shifts to penal investigation may have the effect of encouraging prosecution.
This is because investigators will be encouraged to constantly reassess the
nature of their investigation and to obtain a warrant earlier in investigations in
order to avoid the possibility of a court ruling to exclude evidence, should it
find the investigation to be “penal.”46 If Frater’s prediction proves accurate, it

44

The offences were tax evasion and making false or deceptive statements in tax returns.
Comments by Brian G. Morgan, personal communication as part of his commentary on
2002 Constitutional decisions.
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Frater, “Should the Left Hand Get What the Right Hand’s Got?: Government Information
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could once again demonstrate the fact that judicial decisions often produce
unintended and unforeseen consequences.
Other challenges to government action included Fliss and Nöel. In Fliss, an
accused had freely confessed to an undercover police officer that he had killed
a woman and the conversation was surreptitiously recorded by the officer.
While the taping had been judicially authorized, the trial judge found that the
authorization ought to have been refused for insufficiency of evidence and the
taped confession was therefore inadmissible. However the undercover police
officer was allowed to testify at trial, and to review the transcript of the
confession in order to refresh his memory. The Supreme Court of Canada found
that using the transcript in this manner violated section 8, since the result was
that the officer was able to testify to matters which he otherwise would have
forgotten. Despite the violation of section 8, the Supreme Court found that this
did not affect the fairness of the trial. Therefore it was appropriate to admit the
testimony under section 24(2) of the Charter, since this result would not bring
the administration of justice into disrepute.
In Nöel, the appellant, who was charged with murder, had testified at his trial.
In its cross-examination of the accused, the Crown had relied on inconsistent
testimony he had offered at the earlier trial of his brother, who had been charged
with the same murder and been acquitted. The Court held that, while it was
appropriate for the Crown to utilize the earlier testimony of the accused on
cross-examination for the purpose of testing his credibility, the Crown had gone
further and attempted to have the accused actually adopt incriminating portions
of his earlier testimony. This was held by the Court to be contrary to protection
against self incrimination in section 13 of the Charter, as well as inconsistent
with section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act,47 and a new trial was ordered.

II. FEDERALISM/ABORIGINAL CASES IN 2002
The federalism docket in 2002 continues to reflect the shift away from
division of powers adjudication towards Charter issues. In the four federalism
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2002, the Court was
unanimous on each occasion: Babcock (ruling that section 39 of the Canada
Evidence Act, which exempts Cabinet confidences from disclosure does not
invade the core jurisdiction of superior courts), Kitkatla (upholding provisions
of the British Columbia Heritage Conservation Act, allowing the regulation of
Aboriginal artifacts, as valid provincial legislation), Kreiger (upholding rule
28(d) of the Alberta Code of Professional Conduct, requiring prosecutors to
47
The accused had claimed the benefit of s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act when he had testified at his brother’s trial.
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make timely disclosure of evidence, on the basis that such regulation does not
invade the scheme of federal criminal law and procedure), and Ward (upholding
federal regulations which prohibit the sale or barter of young harp seals or
hooded seals on the basis of the federal fisheries power in section 91(13), but
not on the basis of the criminal law power in section 91(27).)
The only real surprise in these cases arose in Ward, where the Court, in a
decision written by McLachlin C.J., indicated that section 27 of the federal
Marine Mammal Regulations48 could be upheld under the fisheries power in
section 91(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, but not under the section 91(27)
criminal law power. Ward was charged with selling hooded seal pelts contrary
to section 27. He challenged the prohibition on the ground that it was an
attempt by Parliament to regulate local trade. In rejecting the challenge, the
Court held that Parliament’s objective was to eliminate commercial hunting of
these seals by prohibiting their sale, which would decrease the incentive to hunt
them. While the provisions regulated the sale or barter of pelts, the pith and
substance of the legislation was not related to property or civil rights but rather
to the regulation of fisheries. However, the Court went on to conclude, in
obiter, that while section 27 had both a prohibition and a penalty, no valid
criminal law purpose had been established as “Public peace, order, security and
morality played no direct role in its adoption.” 49
This holding is significant since, in a series of cases decided over the past
decade, the Court had given an extremely broad interpretation to the criminal
law power.50 Ward represents the first case in recent years in which the Court
has expressly rejected a federal attempt to justify legislation on the basis of the
criminal law power. At the same time, the Court’s apparent willingness to
impose some limits on the criminal law power had been signaled in the
Firearms Reference51 where the Court, despite upholding the impugned
legislation in that case, noted that the criminal law power “is not unlimited” and
cited with seeming approval concerns identified in the minority dissenting
judgment in the 1997 Hydro-Quebec decision.52
While none of the decisions rendered in 2002 dealt directly with Aboriginal
or treaty rights, the Kitkatla decision clarifies certain important aspects of the

48
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Ward, supra, note 3, para. 55.
See the discussion of these cases in Monahan, Constitutional Law, at 332-43.
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application of provincial laws to Aboriginal peoples. The case concerned a
constitutional challenge brought by the Kitkatla band to the application of
British Columbia legislation, the Heritage Conservation Act (HCA), to
culturally modified trees. According to the Ministry of Small Business,
Tourism and Culture, “CMTs are trees which bear the marks of past Aboriginal
intervention occurring as part of traditional Aboriginal use.” 53 The claimants
argued that sections 12(2)(a), (c) and (d) of the HCA were ultra vires the
province as they referred explicitly to Aboriginal peoples, providing
specifically for the protection as well as destruction of Aboriginal artifacts. In
the alternative, they argued that the provisions touched upon the core of
Indianness and could not apply of their own force and, moreover, could not be
saved by section 88 of the Indian Act because they were not laws of general
application.54
Justice LeBel held that the provisions of the HCA were properly within the
jurisdiction of “Property and Civil Rights” of the province, and were laws of
“general application” pursuant to section 88 of the Indian Act. In defending the
position that the laws are not inconsistent with the Indian Act, LeBel J. argues
that the impugned provisions neither single out Aboriginal peoples nor impair
their status or condition as Indians as they applied equally to all citizens of
British Columbia and all heritage objects and sites, and struck an appropriate
balance between native and non-native interests. Second, LeBel J. decided that
the provisions of the HCA did not “affect the essential and distinctive core values
of Indianness which would engage the federal power over native affairs and First
Nations in Canada,”55 though they might have graver consequences for
Aboriginals.
Kitkatla clarifies the fact that, even where a provincial law makes express
reference to Aboriginal peoples or matters, it may still qualify as a “law of
general application” and apply to Aboriginal peoples through the operation of
section 88 of the Indian Act. The Court was undoubtedly influenced by the fact
that the predominant purpose of the legislation was to preserve and protect
Aboriginal cultural artifacts.
Commenting on the Kitkatla decision, Jean Leclair argues that “Indianness
appears to have been confined to established Aboriginal and treaty rights.”
Therefore, according to Leclair, the Court was able to uphold the Act by
holding that “Aboriginal rights not meeting the established Aboriginal and
treaty rights test, as laid out in R. v. Sparrow had a double aspect” and,
53
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therefore, the validity of the Act could be addressed “through the more familiar
test of the aspect doctrine.”56 In his assessment, Kent McNeil suggest that
Kitkatla should be cause for concern for Aboriginal peoples because it seems to
indicate that the Supreme Court of Canada generally “favours the application of
provincial laws … unless good reasons supported by evidence can be provided
to show why those laws should not apply in particular circumstances.” 57
One federalism case in 2002 that raised significant issues outside of the
Aboriginal context was Krieger. The Krieger case arose when an Albertan
Crown Attorney, K, failed to make timely disclosure of evidence to defence
counsel. The accused complained to the Law Society of Alberta. K sought an
order that the Law Society had no jurisdiction to review a Crown prosecutor’s
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, as this was a matter falling within the
federal government’s jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure. Justices
Iacobucci and Major, for the majority, ruled that the disclosure of relevant
evidence is a legal duty not falling within the realm of prosecutorial discretion.
The Law Society has the power, pursuant to the provincial Legal Profession
Act, to investigate allegations of ethical misconduct if it is believed that the
Crown prosecutor may have acted dishonestly or in bad faith in his or her
failure to disclose relevant evidence. Therefore, the rule in question is intra
vires provincial power under the provincial jurisdiction over the administration
of justice.
As noted by authors Lori Sterling and Heather Mackay, 58 the Krieger
decision is important because the Court explicitly recognized that the
independence of the Attorney General in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion has its foundation in the Constitution. Iacobucci and Major JJ. write:
It is a constitutional principle that the Attorneys General of this country must act
independently of partisan concerns when exercising their delegated sovereign
authority to initiate, continue or terminate prosecutions. So long as they are made
honestly and in good faith, prosecutorial decisions related to this authority are
protected by the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion.59

Thus, according to Sterling and Mackay, the Supreme Court of Canada
demonstrated deference to decisions made by prosecutors such that “only a
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very limited range of cases can properly be brought before a provincial law
society, namely where the prosecutor has acted dishonestly or in bad faith.”60

III. UNANIMITY AND DISSENT ON THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA IN 2002
In last year’s review of the Court’s constitutional decisions from the 2001
calendar year, it was noted that the Court had been unanimous in approximately
three quarters of its constitutional decisions, a relatively high unanimity rate yet
one consistent with historical patterns. (See Table 3 below.) This year saw a
reversal of that trend, with the Court handing down unanimous decisions in 14
(or 61 per cent) of the year’s 23 constitutional decisions. The decrease in
unanimity is the result of unusually sharp divisions in Charter cases in which
dissenting judgments were written in nine of the 19 Charter cases; in contrast
the four Aboriginal and federalism cases in 2002 were unanimous.

TABLE 3
Unanimous versus Split Decisions
In all Constitutional Cases 1995-2002
(Includes Federalism, Aboriginal and Charter)
Year

Unanimous

Split

Percentage Unanimous

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

17
28
14
12
11
8
14
14

9
10
8
9
7
4
5
9

65%
74%
64%
57%
61%
67%
74%
61%

For some commentators, the trend towards greater division in 2002 in
Charter cases is a cause for concern. For example, Richard Haigh 61 remarks that
the low unanimity rate of the Court, combined with what he perceives to be the

60
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Court’s increased use of sarcasm and personalized rhetoric, connotes increasing
frustration and worrisome political and ideological divisions within the Court.
Turning to a consideration of the tendencies of individual members of the
Court, in the three years since Beverley McLachlin was appointed Chief Justice
the most frequent dissenters in constitutional cases have been L’Heureux- Dubé
and Arbour JJ. (see Table 4 below). Justice Arbour’s eight dissents have all
favoured the Charter claimant and have involved a variety of Charter claims.
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé dissented three times in favour of the claimant (all in
section 15 cases) and four times in favour of the government (all involving
legal rights claims). The members of the Court who dissented the least
frequently during this period have been Gonthier J. (three dissents, all in favour
of the government), Iacobucci J. (four dissents, all in favour of the claimants)
and Bastarache J. (four dissents, equally divided).

TABLE 4
Dissents in Constitutional Cases on the McLachlin Court
January 1, 2000 – December 31, 2002
Dissents
(Dissents
Authored)

Direction of Dissent –
favoured
Claim/Challenge

Direction of Dissent
– Opposed
Claim/Challenge

McLachlin C.J.

6

5

1

L’Heureux-Dubé J.

7

3

4

Gonthier J.

3

0

3

Iacobucci J.

4

4

0

Major J.

6

4

2

Bastarache J.

4

2

2

Binnie J.

5

4

1

Arbour J.

8

8

0

LeBel J.

6

4

2

Totals

49

34

15

Justice

IV. CONCLUSION — THE GROWING DEBATE
OVER JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
The debate over the judicial activism versus restraint, which has emerged as
a significant political issue in recent years, has gained significant momentum in
the past year. In large part this was a product of the June 2003 decision of the
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Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General),62 ruling that
the common law definition of marriage as the union of a man and woman to the
exclusion of all others was unconstitutional. This decision has generated
significant controversy, with some critics claiming that it demonstrates that the
judiciary has inappropriately usurped the role of legislatures and governments
in the development of public policy.
One question that arises is whether the recent changes in the membership of
the Court resulting from the retirements of L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ.
will produce a shift of the Court’s approach to the Charter. As Table 4
indicates, these two justices were relatively more likely to support governments
as opposed to Charter claimants in divided legal rights cases (i.e., those arising
under sections 7-14 of the Charter). This might suggest that their departure will
produce an even greater tendency on the part of the Supreme Court to support
Charter claimants as opposed to legislatures and governments in these kinds of
cases. On the other hand, L’Heureux-Dubé J. was one of the strongest
proponents of equality rights on the Court, consistently siding with equalityseeking groups in section 15 cases. It is unclear whether any of the other
members of the Court will carry on with this legacy now that she has retired.
In short, the effects produced by the recent membership changes on the
Court defy easy prediction. Indeed, one constant with the Supreme Court is that
the institution typically defies the predictions and expectations of even the
closest observers. The Court has also demonstrated the capacity to shift ground
in the face of significant public controversy, as evidenced by the two rather
conflicting Marshall decisions handed down in the fall of 2001. One thing that
has become clear in recent years, as reflected in the Court’s deft handling of
politically controversial issues such as Quebec secession or the firearms debate,
is that the Court is a savy political as well as a legal institution. As such, it can
be expected that the Court will be sensitive to the public debate that has
emerged over its role, and that this political debate will subtly but surely shape
and condition its approach to the Charter in the future.

62
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